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Abstract 
Industrial symbiosis (IS) is cooperation between companies to achieve collective 
benefits by supplying and reusing industrial waste to substitute virgin resources in 
production. In this paper, we investigate the IS phenomenon from a supply chain 
management perspective. We propose a collaborative planning model to coordinate 
master planning of operations of waste suppliers and buyers. Furthermore, we analyze 
planning decisions related to IS when waste exchange is combined with virgin resource 
procurement. We demonstrate that conditions of virgin resource procurement affect the 
economic feasibility and waste utilization potential of IS.   
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Introduction 
Resource efficiency is a key aspect in relation to the economic and environmental 
dimensions in sustainable supply chain management. A well-known way to improve 
resource efficiency of operations is reusing waste (Gupta, 1994). In industrial symbiosis 
(IS) one company’s industrial waste (e.g., by-products, excess energy, and residual 
resources) substitutes virgin resources in another company’s production process 
(Chertow, 2000). IS typically involves previously economically unrelated companies 
and manifests in close geographical proximity, for example, in industrial parks or within 
geographical regions. Companies in IS leverage synergies between each other by 
simultaneously reducing waste disposal costs and virgin resource needs. Besides these 
economic benefits, the general environmental contributions of IS are resource savings 
and reductions in pollution emission (Mirata, 2004). 
From a supply chain perspective, IS is in contrast with traditional forward and 
reverse supply chains (Bansal and McKnight, 2009). While the supply network of an 
industry delivers and recycles certain types of end-products, IS connects different 
industries through their waste streams that would otherwise end up in landfills, water, or 
air. There are several examples of IS all over the world (e.g., Chertow, 2000; Heeres et 
al., 2004; Gibbs and Deutz, 2007; Behera et al., 2012). For example, in Kalundborg, 
Denmark, in the best-known and most studied example of IS, eleven companies from 
different industries utilize synergies through 7 energy and 12 waste streams, and form 
an inter-organizational unit of the local industries for collective benefits. Although in  1 
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many cases IS refers to a network of companies, the synergies do however operate 
independently from each other. In other words, an IS network consists of individual 
bilateral relationships and each of these manifests a symbiosis. The goal of this paper is 
to analyze the coordination of these individual operations. 
The academic literature mostly discusses IS from an industrial ecology perspective, 
focusing on e.g. the organizational framework (Behera et al., 2012), evolution and 
development (Gibbs and Deutz, 2007; Chertow, 2007), and innovation capability and 
organizational learning (Baas and Boons, 2004; Sterr and Ott, 2004). Furthermore, the 
literature recognizes the coordination challenges of organizing IS between previously 
unrelated companies and their willingness to collaborate (Mirata, 2004; Bansal and 
McKnight, 2009). In contrast, there is not much literature related to supply chain 
coordination and operations management in IS networks, even though the waste 
exchanges are a kind of buyer-supplier relationship. Some previous work has however 
been done, but mainly related to strategic planning. Cimren et al. (2011) proposed a 
mathematical model for optimal network design of IS considering annual production 
volumes in a set of potential companies that need to decide whether to participate in IS 
or not. More recently, Lee (2012) analyzed different market conditions for determining 
profit-maximizing operating strategies for a company that wants to implement industrial 
waste reuse inside their own organization. 
In this paper, we focus on tactical level planning of operations in bilateral IS. On this 
planning level, the emphasis is on the master planning of operations in and outside IS. 
In most waste reuse scenarios, some storage or waste treatment is required, or additional 
procurement of virgin resources is necessary. These activities obviously increase overall 
costs of the waste exchange and influence the economic feasibility of IS. 
In the following sections, first we discuss the relevance of collaborative planning of 
operations in IS. Then we propose a collaborative planning model for IS to analyze its 
additional economic costs and benefits. To demonstrate our decision model, we present 
an analysis of resource procurement costs in IS. The decision model includes resource 
procurement in and outside IS. The goal of the model is to capture the economic and 
environmental aspects (i.e. waste utilization) related the supply-demand interactions, to 
(i) increase the understanding of IS and (ii) support price setting for companies involved 
in IS, or considering to become involved. As such, we identify trade-offs for companies 
when operating in IS under different scenarios.  
 
Related literature 
Collaborative relations build on trust and expectations of long-term business 
relationships (Hoyt and Huq, 2000). Supply chain collaboration assumes close co-
operation and coordination between business partners on aspects like information 
sharing and joint planning of operations (de Leeuw and Fransoo, 2009). Coordination of 
operations requires supply chain members to include each other’s plans at different 
levels of the planning hierarchy resulting in joint decision making, to improve the 
overall economic, operational and environmental performance. Although collaboration 
develops with information sharing, at different planning levels companies might be 
reluctant to share specific information resulting in information asymmetry. 
Collaborative planning is a joint decision making procedure for aligning plans of 
individual supply chain members assuming information asymmetry (Stadtler, 2009). 
In general, supply chain planning is often divided over three levels: strategic, tactical 
and operational (Fleischmann et al., 2008). Typically, master planning of operations on 
the tactical level considers a planning horizon of 3-12 months and consists of 
procurement, production, and distribution decisions. Collaborative planning on the  2 
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tactical level coordinates these domains between supply chain members. Collaborative 
planning, unlike central planning, often assumes an iterative negotiation procedure 
where conflicting objectives need to be considered (Stadtler, 2009). For instance, Dudek 
and Stadtler (2004) suggested a procedure in which the optimization models of 
individual planning domains are extended to include each other’s preferences. Although 
the partners’ proposals usually cause deviations from the locally optimal plans, the 
overall performance of the supply chain is improved. 
IS relates to an industrial community that seeks enhanced economic and 
environmental performance through collaboration (Lowe, 1997). Nonetheless, a 
sustainable business model, which offers collective and fair benefits, is the most 
important enabler of IS (Behera et al., 2012). Furthermore, trust and willingness to co-
operate also have significant importance in IS relationships (Gibbs and Deutz, 2007). In 
fact, IS often facilitated by the underlying community that shares information (Baas and 
Boons 2004). The collaborative behavior during the development phase shows in 
information sharing about the waste streams and resource demands as well as methods 
of recycling (Sterr and Ott, 2004; Grant et al., 2010). The collaboration often starts with 
negotiation to ensure a fair sharing of benefits (Behera et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
collaboration in IS is often coordinated by a central organizational unit, which has a 
central focus on developing synergies (Mirata, 2004). The most important role of the 
central coordination is to find partners whose supply and demand of waste streams 
match. This kind of “match-making” often focuses on a certain industrial area but can 
also take place on a national level, such as in the case of the National Industrial 
Symbiosis Program in the UK (Mirata, 2004).  
The greatest economic benefit attributed to IS is the geographic proximity between 
the partners, and the resulting low transportation costs. Nevertheless, focusing on a 
larger scale obviously offers more potential relationships (Sterr and Ott, 2004), even 
though the increased distances might reduce its attractiveness. Moreover, waste disposal 
costs and virgin resource prices are also important enablers for IS (Lee, 2012).  
As mentioned earlier, some work has been done on the strategic planning level, 
studying the aggregate match of waste supply and demand (Cimren et al., 2011), and on 
the development of production strategies when adding a waste stream to a product 
portfolio (Lee, 2012). On the other hand, IS has not been previously investigated on 
tactical level. The effect of industrial waste reuse on production and inventories has 
however been discussed in Ferdows and Carabetta (2006), but this work focuses on 
highly integrated production systems. Companies in IS are not integrated in terms of 
production and they operate their individual supply chains. Our work contributes to the 
literature by discussing master planning of waste supply and reuse in IS where suppliers 
and buyers are economically independent.   
Considering the collaborative nature of companies in IS, some level of collaboration 
in planning can also be expected, and a collaborative planning model can be developed 
to support this activity and provide a sound basis for the sharing of costs and benefits. 
Such a collaborative planning model also allows improving waste utilization and 
resource efficiency. 
 
Collaborative planning model for industrial symbiosis 
This section follows Stadtler’s (2009) work on collaborative planning model 
development, whose general framework translates into the following three steps in the 
IS setting: (1) the structure of IS and the relationship among its members (2) the 
decision situation facing each member and (3) the characteristic of the collaborative 
planning procedure.  3 
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Structure and relationships in industrial symbiosis 
Although the IS phenomenon is used to describe an entire system of supplier-buyer 
connections, the bilateral synergies create a network of two-tier supply chains. The two 
tiers may however involve several suppliers and buyers as well as different waste 
streams. If a supplier provides more than one type of waste stream, we assume in this 
paper that these are coordinated separately. For example, the power plant in Kalundborg 
provides gypsum and excess heat as two separately coordinated waste streams. 
However, if a supplier provides the same type of waste stream to more than one buyer 
then they need to be coordinated simultaneously. For example, the excess heat provided 
by the power plant is utilized in several other factories. On the other hand, a buyer may 
procure more than one type of waste stream or the same type from different sources and 
utilize it in one production process. For example, the bioethanol factory in Kalundborg 
often procures different types of biomass residue (e.g. wheat straw and corn stover) 
from farmers. Considering the different types of structures between two tiers, the 
smallest building block in IS is the bilateral relationship. Depending on the number of 
suppliers and buyers on the tiers these relationships based on one waste stream type 
need to be coordinated either separately (1-1) or simultaneously (1-n; n-1). 
In this paper we focus on IS between two or more production companies. 
Furthermore, we assume these production companies operate on separate markets and 
thus have individual supply chains. Therefore, it is important to point out that 
coordinating IS does not necessarily mean the coordination of production on either side. 
We assume here that changing the actual production plans in IS to improve the waste 
exchange would either result in increased inventories or in backorders or lost sales. We 
note that this kind of coordination of waste streams is not unseen, but it assumes a more 
integrated production (Ferdows and Carabetta, 2006). Due to the fact that companies in 
IS are not integrated, we assume fixed production quantities, which determine the 
quality and temporal distribution of waste supply and demand. The operations related to 
IS are the treatment, storage, distribution, and procurement of the waste stream.   
It is important to note that both supplier and buyer participate in IS because they 
capitalize and reduce cost, respectively. In other words, if IS did not provide economic 
benefits for both of its tiers then it would not work. Instead of IS both tiers would 
operate with the original form of disposal and procurement. For example, the power 
plant in Kalundborg could discharge its excess steam in the sea; or the cardboard 
manufacturer may procure only mined gypsum. Depending on treatment, storage, and 
additional procurement costs, as well as the way these are shared, companies might find 
IS economically infeasible. Therefore, “sustainable” IS coordination needs to provide a 
solution that is economically feasible for both tiers and it also maximizes waste 
utilization. From an economic perspective, IS competes against waste disposal and 
virgin resource procurement costs and the negation power of the two tiers regarding the 
price of waste depends on the relative costs of original operations compared to the IS 
alternative. If the disposal of a certain type of waste is costly then the buyer of the waste 
has more power to set the price. On the other hand, when there is no disposal fee, for 
example due to a lack of environmental regulation, or the supplier has more buyers to 
choose from, or the buyer has high virgin resource procurement costs, then the supplier 
has more negotiation power. 
 
Decision situations in industrial symbiosis 
In the following, we elaborate on the decision context that IS encompasses and adds to 
the original supply chain operations. We focus on the tactical level master planning of  4 
Proceedings of the 1st International EurOMA Sustainable Operations and Supply Chains Forum, 
Groningen, the Netherlands, March 24-25, 2014 
operations in a two tier IS. According to Stadler’s (2009) framework we answer the 
following questions: when and which decisions take place with which objectives and 
what kind of information is exchanged. 
In general, collaboration between two parties starts with determining the conditions 
of collaboration, which often incurs negotiating the terms of a contract that is valid over 
a certain period of time (Stadler, 2009). Similarly, one of the most important steps prior 
to implementation of IS is negotiation (Behera et al. 2012). To come to an agreement 
the two tiers need to consider their waste supply and demand quantities, as well as their 
individual master plans for the upcoming planning period (i.e., 3-12 months), to take 
into account possible temporal mismatches. Before the two tiers come to an agreement 
they need to know how IS would affect their disposal and procurement costs, which 
basically determines the economic feasibility of IS and consequently the agreed price of 
the waste. Note that the economic feasibility of IS based on tactical level considerations 
can also be used to support strategic decisions, for example, whether or not to 
participate in IS or to find out the most efficient 1-n network structure.  
With IS, the supplier avoids disposal fees. For example, the pharmaceutical company 
in Kalundborg avoids disposal fees by selling its biomass residue to farmers instead of 
landfilling it. Moreover, the supplier expects to earn profit from selling its waste. 
Consequently, the supplier wants to allocate its waste stream between potential buyers 
in the most profitable way. On the other hand, while disposal is an on-demand option in 
IS, the waste supply is subject to the demand that has restriction on quality and quantity. 
Consequently, the supplier needs additional treatment and storage operations, which 
incur costs. Therefore, before setting a waste price the supplier needs to know how its 
total costs would change with respect to a certain demand on its waste. 
The buyer expects to reduce its resource procurement costs in IS. On the one hand, 
this depends on delivery distance between supplier and buyer in IS. On the other hand, 
it depends on the relative price of the waste compared to the virgin resource. In fact, 
when the IS alternative is closer and waste is cheaper and the supply can cover all the 
demand then the buyer clearly reduces its procurement costs. However, when the buyer 
needs to combine the IS alternative with its original virgin resource supplier then the 
economic feasibility of IS might change. When the buyer procures fewer resources from 
its original supplier than it previously did, we assume that the buyer enters to a different 
contract with the supplier and faces with a higher virgin resource price per unit. 
Consequently, before participating in IS the buyer needs to know how its total costs 
would change with a certain waste supply. 
In this system the decision domains, which can be represented with interconnected 
optimization-based decision models, have conflicting objectives: the supplier tier aims 
to maximize profit while the buyer tier aims to minimize costs. The agreed waste price 
should somehow balance these aims. Using collaborative planning, the supplier and 
buyer tier could negotiate on a (fair) price that makes IS economically feasible for both 
of them. The resulting conditions of collaboration determine the master plan of the IS 
for the following planning horizon that changes the original waste disposal and 
procurement plans.  
In collaborative planning, information asymmetry exists during the negation process. 
This means that some information (e.g., related costs) might be hidden from the 
negotiation partner. For example, in IS it is possible that the buyer is reluctant to share 
the virgin resource price(s) with the supplier in order to keep its bargaining position. 
Similarly, the supplier might be reluctant to share its disposal, treatment and storage 
costs with the buyer for the same reason. On the other hand, in a collaborative “match-
making” event, potential IS participants share their (expected) amount of waste that will  5 
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occur in production during the planning period; and similarly, they share their 
(expected) resource requirements. Figure 1 depicts the structure of the proposed 
collaborative planning model, including the procurement, production, and distribution 
decisions, as well as the information used in the negotiation process. 
 
A collaborative planning procedure for industrial symbiosis 
The collaborative planning procedure governs the negotiation between the tiers. The 
procedure often uses a mediator (an “interface”) for facilitating communication and the 
procedure’s goal is to provide a solution that both tiers accept (Stadler, 2009). 
In collaborative planning terms the central organizational unit of IS is a mediator, 
who is supporting the interactions among members (see Figure 1). During the 
development of IS the mediator keeps track of available waste streams in the region and 
facilitates businesses between suppliers and buyers. To identify and assess opportunities 
during this procedure information and communication technology tools integrate 
information related to waste generations and reuse opportunities in a database (Sterr and 
Ott, 2004, Grant et al., 2010). During the collaborative planning procedure the mediator 
of IS might play the role of an honest broker that is familiar with data (e.g., lowest and 
highest feasible waste price) that members are reluctant to share with each other. 
Thereby, the mediator is able to support the negotiation on a fair price for example in a 
1-n IS. Moreover, the mediator has its own objective: maximizing waste utilization. The 
mediator has overall picture of all supply and demand in a given region, therefore, it is 
able to estimate and facilitate the most resource efficient IS networks.   
In collaborative planning it is important to select who starts the negotiation (Stadtler, 
2009). In IS waste availability (e.g., time and quantity) is the bottleneck of collaboration. 
Therefore, collaborative planning has to start downstream, with a proposal of 
availability from the supplier. In this first iteration the proposal contains the quantity 
and the temporal distribution of the waste and the unit price that would cover the 
planned costs as well as the supplier’s expected profit. Next, the buyer either accepts the 
proposal or suggests a counter-proposal with different delivery times and quantities at 
perhaps a lower price that makes IS economically (more) beneficial. In the next 
iteration the supplier takes this proposal and calculates the resulting storage, treatment 
and additional disposal costs and decides whether or not to accept the buyer’s proposal. 
If the conditions are not acceptable the supplier suggests a counter-proposal with 
different conditions. This iterative procedure continues until the IS members come to an 
agreement or reject the idea of IS due to economic infeasibility. Ideally, the procedure 
will result in a situation where all members of the IS leverage fair economic benefits. 
However, win-win situations might still differ in terms of waste utilization. For example, 
a buyer in IS will choose to procure less waste and obtain virgin resources at a cheaper 
price if that reduces its procurement costs. On the other hand, the mediator is able to 
Figure 1 - Collaborative model for master planning in industrial symbiosis. 
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improve overall resource efficiency by facilitating those potential and mutually 
beneficial IS relationships structures that result in better waste utilization. 
 
Preliminary findings – the buyer’s perspective    
In this section we discuss the buyer’s economic preferences in IS in some theoretical 
scenarios. We consider one supplier with a specific and limited waste stream that is 
provided according to the supplier’s main production plan. The buyer tier consists of 
one buyer, who is able to use the waste to substitute virgin resources in its production. 
Besides the IS alternative the buyer also has an original supplier. We assume that the 
supplier outside IS offers virgin resources at different prices (monetary unit (MU)/unit), 
such that for lower amounts the corresponding price is higher. The resulting pricing 
function is a step function, which means that each price corresponds to a range of 
amounts, following the commonly used all-units quantity discount (e.g. Dolan, 1987). 
In the following we refer to these ranges as contract types (see Table 1 for an example). 
Note that the virgin resource supplier is indifferent to the quantity within a contract, 
which gives flexibility to the buyer. On the other hand, this price structure also limits 
the buyer because it is not able to choose price in-between two contract offers.  
From the buyer’s perspective, when a limited amount of waste is available, it will 
need to choose a contract with its virgin resource supplier to cover its production. We 
created an optimization model that models the buyer’s cost minimizing decision. The 
model was used in experiments with potential waste supply/demand coverage ratios (1-
90%), which represent the available waste quantity, and different waste unit prices 
considered between 0.05-0.95 MU/unit. In each experiment, the buyer needs to decide 
which contract it chooses and how much waste it procures. The buyer faces a trade-off 
between these two options: the more waste it procures, the higher the unit price in the 
contract with the original supplier becomes. Different parameter combinations not only 
result in different optimal costs, but also result in different waste utilizations and 
different feasible waste unit prices that allow maximum utilization.  
Due to its quantity flexibility, each contract normally allows the buyer to procure 
some waste (i.e. the difference between the total resource demand and the lowest 
amount that the contract allows). In the extreme case where there is only one contract, 
which is completely indifferent to the procured quantity, the buyer may utilize all the 
waste and procure the missing amount of virgin resources at the same price as without 
IS. As the number of contract offers increases, the buyer has less and less flexibility 
within each contract and it may utilize less waste instead of choosing a more expensive 
contract. In other words, each contract has a minimum waste supply/demand coverage 
above which it pays off to choose that contract and a maximum waste supply/demand 
coverage that the contract allows to fully utilize. These minimum and maximum 
amounts also depend on the waste unit price. To illustrate the above-mentioned 
behavior, consider that the buyer needs 1000 units of resources over 12 month and it 
can choose between five contracts offered in Table 1. Note that the price differences 
between the contracts and the quantity ranges are equal. When the potential waste 
supply/demand coverage is low (i.e. maximum 20%) the buyer is able to utilize all 
waste and stay with the cheapest virgin resource contract (i.e. 1 MU/unit). Above 20% 
coverage ratio, the waste utilization decreases to around 55% until the point (app. 37% 
Table 1 – Virgin resource supply with 5 contract types for 0-12000 units 
Contract type 1 2 3 4 5 
Price (per unit) 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.00 
Volume range (units) 0-2400 2400-4800 4800-7200 7200-9600 9600-12000  
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coverage ratio) when it pays off to choose the second contract (i.e. 1,25 MU/unit). 
Above this point full utilization is again possible until the maximum coverage ratio (i.e. 
40%) of the contract is reached. 
According to Figure 2 this utilization pattern repeats along different coverage ratios. 
Note that the full utilization interval that a certain contract allows improves as the 
coverage ratio increases. In other words, as the potential waste supply increases, the 
earlier it becomes economically beneficial to choose a more expensive contract and 
utilize all waste. This is because the costs savings attributed to IS increase with the 
amount of waste procured. 
Waste unit price also affects the buyer’s choice and consequently maximum 
utilization. When the buyer chooses a more expensive contract first it can afford that 
only at a low waste unit price (see Figure 2). Above that price only partial utilization 
would be feasible. According to Figure 2, the highest affordable waste price within a 
given contract is reached with the maximum waste supply/demand coverage ratio that 
the contract allows. Furthermore, the highest affordable price depends on the cost 
saving attributed to IS. Therefore, the highest affordable waste unit price increases with 
the potential supply/demand coverage. For example the cardboard manufacturer in 
Kalundborg represents the beginning of the curves in Figure 2 because the gypsum 
waste, procured from the power plant, covers only a small part of their resource demand. 
The pharmaceutical company represents the other end because the excess heat from the 
power plant covers most of their steam requirement. However, note that real life 
contracts can be very different from ones we used in the experiments. 
When there are more contracts to choose from the quantity range in each contract 
decreases. Consequently, the maximum utilization curve that corresponds to different 
waste supply/demand coverage ratios also changes (see Figure 3). When the coverage 
ratio is relatively low the maximum utilization decreases as the number of contracts 
increases because the quantity range of the contract is more limiting. However, as the 
potential coverage ratio increases maximum utilization becomes less and less sensitive 
to changing between different contracts. Note that the more contracts to choose from the 
earlier (i.e. the lower coverage ratio) this positive effect occurs and after a certain 
number of contracts the buyer will be able to choose a contract that allows maximum 
utilization regardless the coverage ratio (see Figure 3).  
 
Conclusion and future work 
Based on our preliminary findings we conclude that the feasibility and resource 
efficiency of IS from the buyer’s perspective depends on the potential waste 
supply/demand coverage ratio and on the relationship that the buyer has with its virgin 
resource supplier. We find that when the buyer needs to procure resources outside IS 
then the supply contracts offered by the virgin resource supplier limit the feasibility and 
resource efficiency of IS. Each contract allows the buyer to operate within a range of 
 
Figure 2 – Waste utilization and resource prices in IS. 
 8 
Proceedings of the 1st International EurOMA Sustainable Operations and Supply Chains Forum, 
Groningen, the Netherlands, March 24-25, 2014 
waste quantities. Cost savings in IS are maximized when the maximum amount of waste 
that the contract allows is procured. Also, this maximum waste utilization allows the 
highest affordable waste unit price. On the other hand, waste above the maximum 
utilization of a contract will not be procured. It is important to point out that in real life 
a buyer might have only a few choices regarding the number of contracts and the 
characteristic of contracts might not be that “equal” as the example in Table 1. 
Consequently, the curves that influence the buyer’s decision are unique.  
In this paper, we analyzed the buyer’s perspective, and will focus more on the 
supplier’s perspective and the overall IS perspective in future work. Based on the 
analysis in this paper, some statements on these perspectives can however already be 
made. Theoretically, from the supplier’s perspective it might be more profitable to 
supply less waste to a buyer, who thus operates with a cheaper contract and can afford 
higher waste unit price. On the other hand, in this case the buyer has higher 
procurement costs and lower utilization is achieved. Nevertheless, the leftover waste 
can be supplied to another buyer if that is possible. In fact, when the supplier has more 
buyers to choose from (i.e. a 1-n IS structure), it faces a decision problem of how to 
allocate its waste in the most profitable way. Moreover, the supplier needs to consider 
the additional treatment and storage costs according to the individual demands. When 
the supplier has more potential buyers the supplier is better off to split its waste stream 
if this allows the buyers to operate with a cheaper virgin resource contract and pay 
higher waste unit price. Note that splitting the waste stream might lead to better 
utilization at a fixed waste price. 
Normally, the supplier is not familiar with the buyers’ contract types due to 
information asymmetry. Therefore, it would be difficult for the supplier to optimize 
waste allocation between the potential buyers. On the other hand, buyers are familiar 
with the available waste quantity, which is usually revealed before the negotiation. 
Consequently, each buyer is familiar with potential cost savings of IS that allows them 
to optimize their procurement plan. When the waste stream is split between more buyers 
there actual potential saving might be less than the expected. This can lead to further 
conflicts and reluctance to participate.  
Collaborative planning usually resolves these conflicts. The mediator is able to 
facilitate the negotiation between a waste supplier and more buyers in a way that it 
improves waste utilization and offers fair benefits for every participant. Furthermore, 
the mediator in IS has a unique role in terms of resource efficiency in collaborative 
planning, which can be reflected in strategic decisions. Therefore, we believe that the 
role of collaborative planning increases with the number of potential buyers. In national 
industrial symbiosis programs where IS is considered in a geographical region it is 
likely that a supplier finds more potential buyers for its waste stream. Consequently, 
collaborative planning would support these national initiatives.    
 
Figure 3 – Maximum waste utilization with different virgin resource contract numbers. 
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In the future we will extend the collaborative planning model with the supplier’s 
decision model. After this, we will experiment with different potential IS structures in 
which we aim to improve waste utilization and also provide fair benefits for each 
member.   
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